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An important criterion for the design of urban water prices is the affordability of water supply for 
poor customers. This paper presents a typology of water pricing options which policy-makers 
have at their disposal in order to address affordability. A review of theoretical insights and 
empirical experiences reveals, however, how the real-world performance of these options 
depends on the characteristics of their technological and socio-economic environment. 
Moreover, possible trade-offs between affordability and other criteria, including efficiency, 
financial sustainability and administrative simplicity, are pointed out. Thereby, the paper is meant 
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1  Introduction  
The fourth principle of the 1992 Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development sets 
out that “water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an 
economic good” (WMO, 1992). This principle is commonly interpreted as an appeal for 
implementing a price for water which reflects its economic value appropriately. At the same time, 
the Dublin Statement also emphasizes that “within this principle, it is vital to recognize first the 
basic right of all human beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable 
price”. Ever since then, this latter requirement has been renewed repeatedly. In 2000, the United 
Nations (UN) agreed on the Millennium Development Goal “to halve, by the year 2015, […] the 
proportion of people who are unable to reach or afford safe drinking water” (UN, 2000). Two 
years later, the UN’s Economic and Social Council again promoted the human right to water 
which “entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water 
for personal and domestic uses” (UN, 2002). These statements pose a formidable challenge for 
policy-making: On the one hand, a price is needed as an instrument to manage the use of the 
scarce resource water. On the other hand, all water users should be able to satisfy their basic 
water needs. Consequently, water price systems have to incorporate some kind of (implicit) 
subsidy, which makes water affordable to the poor. This insight raises two questions:  Which 
water pricing options can effectively address affordability concerns? And what are possible 
conflicts with other relevant (economic) criteria and goals, which also guide the implementation 
of water prices? 
There is an extensive body of literature which examines options to improve the affordability of 
water prices. It includes contributions from academics, representatives of international 
organizations engaged in development cooperation and other authors with very diverse 
backgrounds. As a consequence, this strand of research is characterized by large heterogeneity. 
The water pricing approaches under consideration exhibit very different designs. Differences may 
be related, for example, to the questions of which consumer groups receive a price discount and 
how it is funded. Moreover, the studies range from merely theoretical analyses which neglect real-
world framework conditions to applied case studies which refer to water supply in a specific 
country or even city. Given this heterogeneity, it appears to be difficult to compare the results 
derived for different water pricing approaches. This paper aims at overcoming this restriction. It 
provides an overview and a discussion water pricing options to address affordability. It is based 
on a review of theoretical and empirical findings made in this respect. This review will help to 
identify and understand overarching guidelines for designing water prices. These guidelines may 
assist policy makers in choosing pricing approaches that are appropriate for their regulatory 2 
context. The paper focuses on pricing approaches for urban water supply. An underlying 
assumption of pricing discussions is that corresponding decisions are not left to the market but 
taken by some regulatory authority. Typically, price regulation is only implemented for water 
supply via a network, not for decentralized supply, e.g. by water vendors. Consequently, most of 
the pricing options analyzed in this paper can only benefit water users with access to a network. 
In order to guide the discussion of urban water pricing approaches, the paper proposes an 
analytical framework. It specifies the components of the urban water pricing system which have 
to be taken into account to allow an evaluation of pricing options. Firstly, the design of the water 
price itself is important of course. Relevant components include the object of pricing, the 
assessment base, the average price level, the tariff and the implementation process. Secondly, the 
technological and socio-economic environment forms another decisive component of the water 
pricing system. Its characteristics may have an important impact on the actual performance of 
water prices. Thirdly, the framework specifies the policy objectives which are considered in this 
paper to assess the performance of different water pricing options. While the analysis puts a 
focus on affordability, light will also be shed on three other criteria: efficiency, financial 
sustainability and administrative simplicity. Thus, the choice of water pricing approaches under 
consideration in this paper is based on affordability concerns. However, their evaluation rests on 
a multi-criteria framework. 
Using this framework, the paper then makes three contributions to improving the understanding 
of urban water prices and their performance. (1) A typology of urban water pricing options which 
may be employed to address affordability is developed. This typology organizes the different 
approaches along the major components of water price design – object, assessment base, average 
price level, tariff and implementation process. In this respect, the paper is distinct from existing 
attempts to classify water pricing and subsidy options to address affordability (see Coady et al., 
2004; Komives et al., 2006; le Blanc, 2008; OECD, 2003). Basing the typology on components of 
water price design provides a clearer picture of the toolbox available to policy makers and the 
corresponding incentive structures. (2) It is identified to what extent different approaches to 
urban water pricing may effectively improve the affordability of water supply in the real world. 
For this purpose, explicit reference is made to possible constraints resulting from the 
technological and socio-economic environment. The analysis focuses on the question whether an 
approach may benefit the poor in principle under these conditions. Of course, the eventual 
performance will always depend on the actual extent of the price discount or subsidy. (3) The 
performance of urban water pricing options is also assessed with respect to efficiency, financial 3 
sustainability and administrative simplicity. This helps to identify potential trade-offs between 
affordability and other economic criteria.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the analytical framework. Section 3 
presents the typology of urban water pricing options to address affordability and carries out the 
evaluation of these options with respect to affordability and other criteria. Section 4 summarizes 
and concludes. 
2  Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework developed in this section specifies the elements of the urban water 
pricing system which have to be considered for an appropriate examination of pricing options. 
Figure 1 illustrates that three elements are of particular importance: the design of the water price, 
the environment into which the water price is embedded, and the objectives of water pricing, the 
attainment of which depends on the design as well as the environment of the price. The 
framework is subsequently used to organize the evaluation of water pricing options.  
 















Source: Own figure 
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2.1  Design of the Water Price 
Five components of water price design are distinguished here:  
The object specifies the economic activity the price has to be paid for. A connection charge is paid 
for the installation of a new connection to the water network (usually a one-time activity). A 
consumption charge is levied on the supply of water through this network (usually a continuous 
activity) (Komives et al., 2006, p. 3-4; le Blanc, 2008, p. 15). 
The assessment base is the physical or technological measure the price refers to. One possible 
assessment base may be the number of connections. It is usually implemented for connection 
charges but may also be used for consumption charges (with a fixed monthly or annual charge or 
flat rate). Alternatively, a consumption charge may be related to the actual level of water 
consumption (with a volumetric charge per unit of water consumed). Price systems can also be 
characterized by multiple assessment bases, e.g. when a fixed and a volumetric consumption 
charge are combined. Price systems with one or two assessment bases are usually called single-
part or two-part tariffs, respectively (see, e.g., OECD, 2009, p. 78; Whittington, 2006) – although 
the term “tariff” would be misleading within the framework of this paper (see below). 
The average level of a water price corresponds to the average revenue the water supplier can realize 
per network connection or unit of water consumption. It may refer to actual or theoretical costs 
of water supply, but also to some politically set level.  
The tariff determines how the average price level is distributed to different water users and uses. 
Thus, a clear differentiation is made in this paper between the often synonymously used terms 
“water price” and “water tariff”: the tariff is understood here as one component of the water 
price. Tariffs may be uniform or differentiated across water users and uses (for an overview of 
tariff structures, see, e.g., OECD, 2009, p. 78; Whittington, 2006).  
The implementation process refers to the formal and informal rules of monitoring and enforcing the 
water price in practice. Is the amount of water supplied to customers billed completely? Are 
customers which are unable or reluctant to pay their water bills actually sanctioned by 
disconnection from the network? Are efforts undertaken to detect and penalize illegal water 
withdrawals from the network? 
2.2  Environment of the Water Price 
The environment of water prices incorporates also influences the performance of water prices. It 
has an effect on water users’ consumption decision and their corresponding reaction to price 
changes. Two types of settings of the environment are important in this respect:  5 
The technological environment primarily refers to the characteristics of the water supply infrastructure. 
Relevant properties include the proportions of water users which live in an area where a network 
is available, are actually connected to the network, dispose of a meter or share a connection with 
other households.  
The socio-economic environment encompasses the characteristics of the water users, such as the level, 
distribution and timing of income streams, household size, dwelling properties and general 
preferences (e.g. preferences regarding service quality and risk aversion). These determine 
consumption levels and possible reactions to price changes. Moreover, the socio-economic 
environment also consists of institutions, i.e. the formal and informal rules which guide the 
interactions of economic actors and organizations (see, e.g., North, 1990). It refers to rules, apart 
from the water price, which may drive the behaviour of urban water users – but also those rules 
which may affect the decisions of policy-makers on water price design. Relevant rules may 
include inter alia the prevailing perceptions with respect to water and regulation, the legal status 
of water users, the lobbying power of different stakeholder groups in the water sector and, more 
generally, the degree of formality of an economy. 
2.3  Objectives of the Water Price 
Water prices are usually meant to pursue a variety of policy objectives. Therefore, discussing 
water pricing in the light of affordability concerns only is of limited use. Other possible objectives 
and corresponding trade-offs have to be taken into account. Consequently, the analysis in this 
paper provides an evaluation with respect to four objectives: affordability, efficiency, financial 
sustainability and administrative simplicity. 
2.3.1  Affordability 
Affordability is defined here as the ability of water customers to pay for a subsistence level of 
water supply (Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007, p. 1039).
1 It is useful to distinguish between 
affordability of access to a water service and affordability of water consumption (Estache et al., 
2002). This differentiation is important since not only consumption charges but also connection 
charges may be prohibitively high. Affordability considerations usually rest on the assumption 
that there is something like a basic human right to water which should be provided to people 
regardless of their ability to pay (Whittington, 2003, p. 63-64).  
                                                 
1 In fact, the (subsidized) provision of a subsistence level of water supply may also be justified for efficiency reasons 
if it produces positive externalities in terms of improved health outcomes, reduced incidence of epidemics or 
reduced time spent on fetching water (Agthe and Billings, 1987, p. 275; Hajispyrou et al., 2002, p. 667). 6 
The performance of a water pricing system with respect to affordability is commonly measured 
by the coverage rate. It reveals which share of water users with affordability problems actually 
benefit from a subsidy incorporated in the pricing system. Inversely, the so-called error of 
exclusion represents the share of customers with affordability constraints who do not receive any 
subsidy to their water bills (Coady et al., 2004, p. 10; le Blanc, 2008, p. 13-15). 
How to assess which water users are actually not able to pay for water connection and 
consumption is a heavily debated question (Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007, p. 1039; Foster and 
Yepes, 2006, p. 15; Gawel and Bretschneider, 2011; OECD, 2003). This paper refers to the 
definition that is used by the World Health Organization and most policy makers. A water user is 
assumed to face an affordability constraint if the share of expenditures for a minimum of water 
supply (usually 20 to 100 litres per capita and day) in total income exceeds a certain threshold 
(usually three to five percent) (Howard and Bartram, 2003; OECD, 2003). 
2.3.2  Efficiency 
The efficiency criterion refers to the overall welfare a society obtains from water supply. It 
basically requires that the cost-benefit ratio of water supply be maximized. For urban water 
supply, the efficiency criterion allows answering two questions: (1) what is the optimal aggregate 
level of water consumption in an urban area, as compared to other current and future uses, and 
(2) what is the optimal allocation of this aggregate level to different urban water users (Bithas, 
2008, p. 223)? The aggregate level of water consumption can be assumed to be efficient when the 
marginal cost of supplying the last unit of water equals its marginal benefits.
2 Costs should 
include operation, maintenance and investment costs but also opportunity and external 
environmental costs of water supply. Benefits should include the direct value to water users but 
also benefits from returned flows, indirect benefits and intrinsic values (Rogers et al., 2002). In 
this sense, an efficiently set water price will also induce an ecologically sustainable water use. 
Economic theory suggests that an efficient aggregate level of water supply as well as an efficient 
allocation to different water users can be attained by setting the average price level equal to the 
marginal cost of water supply and imposing a uniform volumetric water tariff (Whittington, 2003, 
                                                 
2 With increasing levels of water supply, marginal costs of water supply are usually increasing, while marginal benefits 
are decreasing. 7 
p. 63). In this case, each water user will choose a level of water consumption where his 
willingness to pay for another unit of water (and his marginal benefits) equals the water price.
3  
Obviously, an efficient water price which is uniform across all water users may raise affordability 
concerns as it does not account for people’s ability to pay. Classic economic theory would suggest 
that in this case affordability should be addressed by an additional lump-sum income transfer to 
poor customers. For a variety of reasons, however, such transfers may be ruled out politically in 
most developing countries (World Bank, 2000, p. 23). If affordability can only be addressed by a 
modification in price design, it is important to choose a pricing option with a high targeting ratio 
(or a low error of inclusion) which directs the incorporated subsidy primarily to those customers 
who are actually in need (le Blanc, 2008, p. 13-15). This reduces trade-offs in terms of efficiency. 
However, it is also important to consider that measures to increase the targeting ratio – e.g. 
granting subsidies less generously – often simultaneously bring down the coverage ratio (Coady et 
al., 2004, p. 10; Foster et al., 2002a). 
2.3.3  Financial Sustainability 
In this paper, financial sustainability refers to the implications of water pricing systems for (1) the 
budget of the water supplier and (2) the budget of the government. Both implications are closely 
linked for most water pricing options. Financial sustainability basically requires that water prices 
should allow the water supplier to recover its supply costs. According to Whittington (2003, p. 
63), revenues from water pricing have to be sufficient to pay the operation and maintenance costs 
of the water supplier’s operations, repay loans which are needed to replace and expand the capital 
stock, provide a return on capital at risk and maintain a cash reserve for unforeseen events. 
Financial sustainability thus requires that the average price level reflect the average cost per unit 
of water supply. If a water supplier is unable to fully recover the cost of supply, this is likely to 
have negative implications for the government’s budget. In order to maintain and extend water 
supply infrastructure, it may then be necessary to compensate the supplier’s deficits by 
government transfers funded from general tax revenues.  
Financial sustainability and affordability are not necessarily conflicting objectives for water 
pricing. If a water price system is meant to satisfy both criteria simultaneously, the tariff has to be 
designed to incorporate a cross-subsidy. The implicit subsidy granted to some (poor) customers 
by imposing a price below average cost on them has to be compensated by a price above average 
                                                 
3 In fact, price differentiation may be efficient when water customers are characterized by different price elasticities 
of water demand (Boiteux, 1956; Ramsey, 1927). 8 
costs paid by other water users. In this respect, it may again be decisive how well different pricing 
approaches target the subsidy to those water customers with actual affordability problems. The 
lower the targeting ratio, the smaller the share of water users which actually pay a higher price 
and the more difficult cost-recovery will be. Moreover, a low targeting ratio also reduces the 
amount of subsidies which is available to the really poor given that the overall budget of the 
water supplier or government is fixed (Coady et al., 2004, p. 5). 
2.3.4  Administrative Simplicity  
The criterion of administrative simplicity reflects the ease (or difficulty) of implementing a water 
price appropriately in reality. In economic terms, it depends on the transaction costs which have 
to be incurred by the regulator, the water supplier and the water users. A useful distinction for 
transaction costs is between decision-making costs and monitoring and enforcement costs 
(Birner and Wittmer, 2004).
4  
Decision-making costs arise before water is actually supplied to a water user. In order to design 
an efficient and financially sustainable water price, the regulator has to assess the benefits and 
costs related to water supply. If affordability concerns are to be taken into account, he also has to 
find out about the ability-to-pay of water users. These assessments require information which 
typically is costly to obtain. Decision-making costs may also be faced by water users, for example, 
if they are required to apply to an agency and provide credible information on their economic 
status to qualify for price discounts (le Blanc, 2008, p. 19-20).  
In contrast, monitoring and enforcement costs occur once water is actually supplied. They are 
mainly incurred by the water supplier. The supplier has to maintain and read water meters and 
bill the corresponding amounts of water consumed. Moreover, it has to keep the water network 
under surveillance in order to prevent illegal withdrawals. If water users refuse to pay water bills, 
the water supplier has to impose sanctions to enforce the water price. 
These definitions reveal that in many instances, there will be trade-offs between administrative 
simplicity and the accuracy needed to address affordability (and efficiency and financial 
sustainability) properly.   
                                                 
4 For an overview of other possible definitions and typologies of transaction costs, see Allen (1991) or McCann et al. 
(2005). 9 
3  Evaluation of Water Pricing Options to Address Affordability 
This section is devoted to reviewing the theoretical insights and empirical experiences which have 
been gained for different water pricing options to address affordability. The discussion is 
organized along the different components of water price design. The resulting typology of water 
pricing options is illustrated in Figure 2. Grey-shaded options necessarily constitute a price 
discount or subsidy to some water users or uses and may therefore be considered as a means to 
improve the affordability of water services. These options will be explained in further detail in the 
subsequent subsections. For each option, light will be shed on the performance with respect to 
affordability. In this context, particular attention will be paid to effects of the characteristics of 
the environment, including technologies, actors and institutions. In addition, the performance of 
the pricing options regarding the other criteria efficiency, financial sustainability and 
administrative simplicity will be assessed to highlight possible trade-offs with affordability. 
Obviously, the different design options to address affordability in water pricing are not exclusive. 
Most options can be combined vertically as well as horizontally. As a result, policy-makers can 
create a complex pricing strategy with multiple subsidy components – as it is usually done in 
practice. Of course, the overall performance of the water price system depends on the interplay 
of the different design components. Nevertheless, the evaluation of water price design first of all 
requires a proper understanding of each component in isolation. That is why the different 
options to address affordability will be analyzed separately for each component in this paper. 10 
Figure 2: Typology of water pricing options to address affordability 
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3.1  Options Related to the Object of Pricing 
As has been pointed out earlier, two basic approaches can be distinguished regarding the object 
of pricing: a consumption charge and a connection charge. Neither approach necessarily implies a 
subsidy to some water users. However, the choice between consumption and connection charges 
has important implications for the affordability of pricing if a subsidy is incorporated at a 
subsequent stage for one of the other components of price design. These implications will be 
discussed in this section. The attainment of the other policy objectives is irrespective of the 
object of pricing chosen. It depends on how well the other components are designed. Therefore 11 
efficiency, financial sustainability and administrative simplicity will not be addressed in this 
section.  
By definition, a subsidy incorporated into a consumption charge for network supply is only available 
to water users which are connected to the network (the only exception is a price reduction for 
public standpipes, see Section 3.4). Thus, in most cases, the maximum achievable coverage rate 
corresponds to the share of connected users among the poor (World Bank, 2000, p. 11). 
However, particularly in cities in developing countries, a significant share of water users is not 
connected to the network. For example, urban connection rates are far below 50% in in many 
cities of Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, unconnected water users are particularly likely to be poor 
(Foster et al., 2002a; 2002b, p. 2; WHO, 2010). Therefore, consumption subsidies may exclude 
many persons with affordability constraints. This limitation is particularly important as unit prices 
for water delivered through decentralized means of supply, such as water vendors, are usually far 
above those for network supply (see, e.g., Keener et al., 2010, p. 23).  
This implies in turn that increasing the connection rate is an important measure for poverty 
alleviation in many developing countries (Estache et al., 2002, p. 82; Komives et al., 2005, p. 4). 
However, lump-sum up-front costs of getting connected to the network may be prohibitively 
high for some water users – a restriction which is aggravated by the fact that poor households are 
often unable to receive loans at reasonable interest rates. This obstacle can be overcome by 
incorporating a subsidy in the connection charge (Komives et al., 2005, p. 123; Whittington, 2003, p. 
69). The coverage rate of connection subsidies is usually substantially higher than that of 
consumption subsidies (Foster et al., 2002a). Nevertheless, the actual effects of such subsidies are 
subject to restrictions. Firstly, a connection subsidy can only benefit water users in districts where 
a network is actually available (Komives et al., 2006, p. 18). Water suppliers usually do not offer a 
connection to all due to restrictions in funding. In fact, suppliers may have incentives to connect 
low-cost consumers with priority, particularly when private sector participation combines with 
weak regulation. This so-called cream-skimming is likely to affect particularly poor water users 
negatively as they are often more costly to supply. Reasons include higher commercial risk and 
billing costs, the fact that poor neighbourhoods are often located in distant and topographically 
difficult sites and the in many cases relatively small amounts of service are consumed by the poor, 
which implies that fixed costs are spread over a relatively small number of consumption units 
(Estache et al., 2002, p. 16). Secondly, water users may have to meet additional requirements in 
order to get connected. Most notably, a legal land title is often compulsory, which means that 
inhabitants of predominantly poor informal settlements are not eligible (Debomy et al., 2005, p. 
1). Thirdly, there are costs of establishing a network connection apart from the actual connection 12 
charge. Water users also have to undertake intra-households fixtures and may be required to 
provide a security deposit. More generally, water users may choose not to connect because they 
expect overall expenditures for water consumption to increase with network supply. This fear is 
often associated with the timing and format of utility payments which is usually less flexible than 
with decentralized supply and may be incompatible with household income streams (Estache et 
al., 2002, p. 92; Komives et al., 2006, p. 12). Consequently, consumption as well as connection 
subsidies may exclude a significant share of the poor. 
3.2  Options Related to the Assessment Base 
The assessment base for a connection charge is necessarily the connection. In this case, there is 
no clear relationship between the performance of water pricing and the assessment base. 
Therefore, this section focuses on the implications of choosing the assessment base for a 
consumption charge. A volumetric charge is based on the actually metered amount of water 
consumption. It does not necessarily result in a subsidy, but it constrains the performance of 
subsidies incorporated in the design of subsequent price components. A consumption charge 
raised per connection, i.e. a fixed charge or flat rate, is based on an average level of historic or 
estimated consumption per connection.
5 It provides a subsidy to water users whose actual 
consumption is above the average level (Komives et al., 2006, p. 4). In practice, both approaches 
are often combined as two-part tariffs (OECD, 1999, 2010). 
3.2.1  Affordability 
By definition, subsidizing a volumetric charge can only benefit water customers with a metered 
connection (le Blanc, 2008, p. 34; Whittington, 2006, p. 20). That is, the maximum coverage rate 
is limited to the metering rate among the poor. However, metering rates are often low, even in 
many OECD countries (OECD, 1999, p. 46). Moreover, poor customers are less likely to have a 
meter as water suppliers often charge for their installation and maintenance (Komives et al., 2006, 
p. 11). 
In contrast, the coverage rate of a flat rate is not restricted by the extent of metering. Instead, the 
performance of the incorporated subsidy depends on whether the poor consume above or below 
the average consumption level. On the one hand, water consumption is usually assumed to 
decrease with income (for an overview, see Worthington and Hoffman, 2008). On the other 
                                                 
5 In fact, a fixed charge is usually meant to recover fixed costs of water supply while a flat rate is to recover variable 
costs. This distinction is not made here as it does not affect the general implications for the affordability of overall 
water consumption. 13 
hand, the consumption of poor customers per connection may be relatively high as they typically 
have larger families and often share a connection (Bithas, 2008, p. 225; Boland and Whittington, 
2000, p. 229; Foster and Yepes, 2006, p. 23; OECD, 2009, p. 91; Whittington, 2003, p. 66). 
Therefore, the overall effect of a flat rate in terms of affordability is ambiguous. 
3.2.2  Efficiency  
The implementation of an efficient pricing scheme is only possible with a volumetric charge as this 
allows facing water users with the marginal costs for each unit of water they consume. With a flat 
rate, the marginal price of water is zero, i.e. increasing consumption by one unit does not raise the 
water bill. Consequently, there is no incentive to save water. Individual and aggregate levels of 
consumption tend to be inefficiently high (OECD, 1999; Whittington, 2003, p. 66; 2006). 
3.2.3  Financial Sustainability 
At least in theory, both a volumetric charge and a flat fee can be designed to recover water supply 
costs if the total amount of consumption as well as its average per connection is known. If 
information is imperfect, however, and if either option is meant to recover fixed as well as 
variable costs, financial sustainability may be impaired. A volumetric charge will be insufficient to 
recover the fixed costs of supply if actual total water consumption is below the estimated level. A 
flat rate will not recover the variable costs of supply if the average consumption per connection 
increases about the expected value. This is particularly likely when tapped water is resold to 
unconnected users and per-capita consumption increases as a consequence of economic and 
income growth (Whittington, 2006, p. 19; Whittington et al., 1990). Nevertheless, water suppliers 
may prefer flat rates over variable charges as they provide relatively stable revenues when the 
share of fixed costs in total costs is high (O'Dea and Cooper, 2008, p. 28; OECD, 1999, p. 45). 
Obviously, a superior solution is a two-part tariff with a fixed charge to recover fixed costs and 
volumetric charge to recover variable costs (Brown and Sibley, 1986; Coase, 1946). 
3.2.4  Administrative Simplicity 
The main difference associated with the choice of the assessment base for a consumption charge 
is related to the implementation costs. These costs are higher for a volumetric charge than for a 
fixed charge as the latter does not require metering (O'Dea and Cooper, 2008, p. 28; OECD, 
1999, p. 45). 14 
3.3  Options Related to the Average Price Level 
Reducing the average price level below actual full cost of water supply (under-pricing) is an 
option which can be implemented for any object and assessment base of pricing chosen. It can 
also be incorporated into two-part consumption charges. A commonly discussed approach in this 
respect is the so-called Feldstein-pricing where the fixed charge is set below cost at the expense 
of a higher volumetric charge (Feldstein, 1972). Another option is to offer a price menu: Water 
users may be allowed to choose between an option with low fixed charge and high volumetric 
charge and another with high fixed charge and low volumetric charge (le Blanc, 2008, p. 6; 
OECD, 2003, p. 94). Under-pricing is widespread throughout the developing as well as the 
developed world (Dinar and Subramanian, 1998, p. 246; Komives et al., 2005, p. 21; OECD, 
1999, p. 118; Raghupati and Foster, 2002, p. 5). A Global Water Intelligence study finds, for 
example, that only 39 percent of the surveyed utilities raise prices which cover operation and 
maintenance costs (GWI, 2004). A reduction of the average price level may be the only feasible 
option when there are limitations to implementing a differentiated tariff with a cross-subsidy. 
This is the case when the share of poor customers in water consumption is high and there are 
only few water users which are actually able to pay a higher price to fund the subsidy.  
3.3.1  Affordability 
Under-pricing brings about a universal price reduction. Consequently, it is beneficial to all poor 
water customers, at least in the short term. However, this approach will deteriorate affordability 
problems in the long run. Firstly, it hampers the extension of existing networks since water 
suppliers are not able to recover their cost (see below). Thus, those districts which do not yet 
have access to the network yet – and which are predominantly poor – are less likely to be 
connected in the future (OECD, 2009, p. 85). Secondly, low average price levels promote 
overconsumption (see below). This results in higher water scarcity and higher costs of supply in 
the future. Correspondingly higher water prices will then be even less affordable (Bithas, 2008, p. 
225). 
Particular issues for affordability arise with Feldstein pricing. It basically implies that larger water 
users pay a larger share of the fixed costs relative to their consumption (Feldstein, 1972). This 
solution improves the affordability of water supply for poor users when consumption is only a 
function of income. It causes affordability problems, however, when poor customers have large 
levels of consumption, e.g. due to large family sizes or shared connections. Such problems can be 
overcome by offering a price menu. In this case, each customer can choose the price option 15 
(high/low fixed charge and low/high volumetric charge) which minimizes his water bill (le Blanc, 
2008, p. 6). 
3.3.2  Efficiency 
Under-pricing a single-part charge implies that water users do not face the true costs of water 
supply. This results in inefficiently high levels of consumption (World Bank, 2000, p. 12).
6 The 
issue is more complex with two-part consumption charges. If only the fixed charge is reduced, 
and the volumetric charge is set equal to marginal costs, an efficient level and allocation of water 
consumption can be achieved. In contrast, with Feldstein-pricing, the marginal price of water is 
in fact inefficiently high. Empirical evidence indicates, however, that the corresponding welfare 
losses may be small (Feldstein, 1972; García Valiñas, 2005). With menus of two-part charges, at 
least the allocation of water consumption across water users and uses will be inefficient as 
marginal prices are not uniform. 
3.3.3  Financial Sustainability 
A subsidy which is implemented by a general reduction of the average price level is badly 
targeted. It also benefits all non-poor water users. This implies that the price reduction usually 
cannot be recovered a cross-subsidy. Water suppliers face a lack of funding which can only be 
compensated by government support and transfers (World Bank, 2000, p. 12-13). There are only 
two exceptions: (1) with a two-part pricing scheme, the reduction of the fixed component can be 
recovered by an increase of the variable component and vice versa, and (2) a reduced charge for 
newly established connections can be compensated by a surcharge imposed on existing 
customers, as for example in Argentina (Foster, 2004, p. 19-20). 
3.3.4  Administrative simplicity 
A general reduction of the average price level for a single-part charge can be easily implemented 
(World Bank, 2000, p. 12). Higher decision-making costs have to be incurred with two-part 
pricing, such as Feldstein-pricing or price menus. In this case, the challenge may consist in 
designing fixed and variable components such that supply costs are covered overall. Also, price 
menus increase decision-making costs for water users as they have to choose a pricing scheme 
which is most appropriate for their individual needs. 
                                                 
6 Additional welfare losses result from public taxes which the government has to raise to close the financial gaps of 
water suppliers (see Section 3.3.3) (Timmins, 2002). 16 
3.4  Options Related to the Tariff 
A tariff incorporates a subsidy if it is differentiated across water users and uses. Tariff 
differentiation can be roughly classified into self-selection and administrative selection (Komives 
et al., 2006, p. 5; le Blanc, 2008, p. 19; Yepes, 2003, p. 4-5). 
Self-selection means that water users’ decisions determine whether or not they pay a subsidized 
water price. This approach is usually implemented by making the unit water price increase in the 
level of consumption. A certain subsistence amount of water – the so-called lifeline block – is priced 
below the average such that it corresponds to the ability to pay of the poorest customers (Bithas, 
2008, p. 225; Groom et al., 2008, p. 4). In turn, the unit price for higher levels of consumption is 
above the average price level. Increasing block tariffs (IBTs) with a step-wise increase of the 
marginal unit price are most common (OECD, 1999, 2003). Komives et al. (2005, p. 29) find that 
roughly 80 per cent of the surveyed water suppliers worldwide apply IBTs for residential 
customers. IBTs can also be designed such that the size of the lifeline block is not fixed but 
depends on the number of persons supplied by a connection (Dahan and Nisan, 2007, p. 3; 
Meran and von Hirschhausen, 2009, p. 14; OECD, 2009, p. 91). Related to IBTs are a uniform 
price with rebate (UPR), which produces a lump-sum absolute reduction of all customers’ water 
bills (Boland and Whittington, 2000),  and a certain amount of consumption included in the fixed 
minimum charge (Castro-Rodríguez et al., 2002; Estache et al., 2002, p. 62-63). In both cases the 
unit price for the initial consumption block is zero. Alternatively, self-selection can also be 
induced by differentiating the tariff for different levels of service quality. In particular, the price may 
be higher for water supplied through in-house connections than for public taps (Komives et al., 
2006, p. 3; le Blanc, 2008, p. 7; Whittington, 2003, p. 72). Connected customers can then choose 
between different levels of service quality and corresponding tariffs. In general, self-selection is 
only applicable for consumption charges (and only for volumetric consumption charges if it is 
based on the level of consumption). 
In contrast, administrative selection can be implemented for any object and assessment base of 
water pricing. In this case, some authority – such as the water supplier or its regulator – decides 
which groups of water users are eligible for a price discount. This decision can be based on 
individual welfare means, i.e. poor customers pay lower prices than their wealthier counterparts. This 
approach requires a means test which collects user-level data on income and other indicators, 
such as household size, housing characteristics, location of a dwelling or assets owned by the 
user. It is currently used in Chile, the most prominent example, but also in a variety of other 
countries including Argentina, Paraguay and many former Soviet states (Foster, 2004; Foster and 
Yepes, 2006; Gómez Lobo, 2001; Gómez Lobo and Contreras, 2003a, 2003b; World Bank, 2000, 17 
p. 17-19). Tariff differentiation may be applicable to all consumption or to subsistence 
consumption only. The amount of the tariff discount is often subject to a burden limit. It is 
assessed for each water customer such that his payments for water supply do not exceed a certain 
percentage of his income. Alternatively, the differentiation may also come as a fixed absolute (e.g. 
a voucher) or relative reduction of water-related expenditures (World Bank, 2006, p. 58-59). An 
administrative differentiation can also be based on proxies of individual welfare. One option 
consists in making prices dependent on the geographical location of the user. That is, the price is 
generally reduced in neighbourhoods which are poor on average. Such differentiation is usually 
based on some kind of poverty mapping and may take into account different criteria (similar to 
an individual means test) (Coady et al., 2004, p. 63). Geographically differentiated tariffs exist, for 
example, for consumption charges in general in Bogotá (Foster and Yepes, 2006, p. 27; Gómez 
Lobo and Contreras, 2003a, p. 8), for flat rates paid by customers without individual meters in 
Lima (SUNASS, 2010) or connection subsidies in Dakar (Debomy et al., 2005, p. 2). Another 
proxy of individual welfare to differentiate the tariff may be the economic activity of a water user. 
Typically, lower water prices are imposed on residential customers than on commercial and 
industry water users (Yepes, 2003, p. 4). 
3.4.1  Affordability 
Differentiation by the level of consumption benefits the poor if these actually exhibit low consumption 
levels, i.e. if consumption is positively correlated with income (OECD, 2009, p. 91). Hajispyrou 
et al. (2002), Groom et al. (2008) and Ruijs (2009) show in case studies for Cyprus, Beijing and 
Sao Paulo that IBTs in fact increase the welfare of poor water customers compared to a uniform 
tariff. Boland and Whittington (2000) point out that UPR schemes allow for an even stronger 
price reduction for subsistence water consumption than IBTs for given level of overall revenue. 
However, there are also studies how do not find a systematically positive effect of IBTs in terms 
of affordability (see, e.g., Rietveld et al., 2000). This observation can be explained by the 
shortcoming that simple IBT schemes refer to the level of consumption per connection and 
disregard the number of people depending on that connection. This number may be high when 
families are large, when several households share one connection or when water is sold to 
neighbours. These conditions are likely to be met for a substantial share of poor customers 
(Bithas, 2008, p. 225; Boland and Whittington, 2000, p. 229; Debomy et al., 2005, p. 8; Estache et 
al., 2002, p. 62-63; Foster and Yepes, 2006, p. 23; OECD, 2003, p. 81; 2009, p. 91; Rietveld et al., 
2000; Whittington, 1992, p. 76; 2003, p. 66). As a consequence, consumption may be high at a 
connection even though customers are poor. This effect is hardly mitigated by economies of 
scale associated with shared consumptive activities such as housecleaning or cooking (Dahan and 18 
Nisan, 2007).  As high levels of consumption bring about a relatively high unit price, the ability to 
pay for basic water needs may be impaired for these poor customers. In case studies, Foster et al. 
(2002b, p. 7) and Komives et al. (2006, p. 10) show that the error of exclusion under IBTs may 
be 50 per cent and higher.
7 Obviously, these drawbacks can be overcome as soon as the tariff 
considers the number of customers per connection, e.g. by allowing for a larger lifeline block for 
large families (Liu et al., 2003). 
Differentiation by service quality can be more effective in reaching the poor than IBTs. This is 
because the willingness to accept a low-quality service such as public standpipes can be supposed 
to be a better indicator of poverty than consumption. Moreover, service differentiation is the 
only tariff option which is not only available to water users with in-house connections but also to 
those who have at least access to a standpipe. This approach may allow errors of exclusion as low 
as 23 per cent in Bangalore (Foster et al., 2002b, p. 7). 
Theoretically, tariff differentiation by individual welfare means can be employed to subsidize every poor 
connected to the network. Empirical studies, however, report relatively high errors of exclusion – 
for example, 89 per cent in Chile - which even go beyond the values observed for IBTs (Foster et 
al., 2002a; Foster and Yepes, 2006, p. 29; World Bank, 2000, p. 17). On the one hand, this failure 
can be explained by an improper design of the means test and additional, restrictive eligibility 
criteria, such as a burden limit or the requirement to agree on a payment schedule for overdue 
bills. On the other hand, eligible water users may fail to apply for a tariff discount due to a lack of 
information or the administrative burden produced by the application process. Moreover, they 
may not have an incentive to apply when non-payment is not sanctioned by disconnection 
anyway. 
Differentiation by geographical location is a good means to make tariffs affordable if poor and wealthy 
customers live in clearly segregated neighbourhoods (Coady et al., 2004, p. 48; Komives et al., 
2006, p. 16; le Blanc, 2008, p. 36). In addition, the exclusion of poor customers living in non-
poor districts can be avoided by allowing them to apply for a reduced tariff, as it is done in 
Colombia (Gómez Lobo and Contreras, 2003a, p. 9). Empirical evidence for the performance of 
geographically differentiated schemes is very mixed. Errors of exclusion close to zero have been 
found for Colombia. However, it is emphasized that this not only attributable to tariff 
differentiation but rather to a generous design of the subsidy which is paid up to relatively high 
levels of income and available to 97% of all connected households (Foster and Yepes, 2006, p. 
                                                 
7 However, it has to be emphasized that this low coverage ratio does not solely result from the specific characteristics 
of IBTs but is also attributable to the shortcomings of subsidies incorporated into consumption charges in general. 19 
29; Gómez Lobo and Contreras, 2003a, p. 17). In other cases, significantly higher errors of 
exclusion have been found, e.g. 60% in Bangalore, India (Foster et al., 2002a; Komives et al., 
2006, p. 17). 
There is a lack of empirical studies analysing to what extent tariff differentiation by economic activity 
makes water more affordable to the poor. It may be fair to assume that the majority of poor 
water users are in fact residential. However, commercial customers, running small family 
businesses, for example, may also face affordability constraints and usually do not receive a 
subsidy. 
3.4.2  Efficiency 
Tariff differentiation generally implies that the marginal cost of water supply is not imposed on 
each customer and unit of water consumed. This results in a suboptimal allocation of water. 
Water users facing a low (high) price choose an inefficiently high (low) level of consumption 
(Boland and Whittington, 2000, p. 224; World Bank, 2000, p. 19). IBTs, for example, have been 
found to produce significant welfare losses compared to a uniform tariff (Groom et al., 2008; 
Hajispyrou et al., 2002; Rietveld et al., 2000; Ruijs, 2009).
8 
The actual extent of welfare losses can be reduced by choosing the design of tariff differentiation 
appropriately. The first requirement is that as few water users as necessary receive a price 
discount, i.e. that the subsidy be targeted only to customers with affordability constraints and 
subsistence consumption levels in order to avoid inefficient distortion. In this respect, 
differentiation by consumption appears to be particularly detrimental as it grants subsidies to 
low-volume customers irrespectively of whether these are poor or rich. This shortcoming is 
aggravated by the fact that limiting the size of the first block (or rebate) to subsistence 
consumption is often difficult for political reasons (Boland and Whittington, 2000, p. 225-226; 
Foster and Yepes, 2006, p. 24; Groom et al., 2008, p. 17; Komives et al., 2005, p. 24; le Blanc, 
2008, p. 35). Boland and Whittington (2000) argue that an UPR performs better than an IBT in 
terms of efficiency. More importantly, however, differentiation by consumption in general is 
usually outperformed by other types of tariff differentiation. For example, errors of inclusion 
under IBTs are found to be as high as 71 per cent in Bangalore and compare with significantly 
lower values for differentiation by service quality (30 per cent), by individual welfare means 
                                                 
8 It is a common misunderstanding that a progressive tariff differentiation as under an IBT is efficient because it 
matches the rising marginal cost curve of water supply and penalizes large customers (for further elaboration, see 
Boland and Whittington, 2000, p. 224; Sterner, 2003, p. 329). 20 
(below 40 per cent) or geographical location (below 50 per cent) (Foster et al., 2002a, 2002b). 
Welfare losses of administratively differentiated tariffs are likely to be particularly low when 
subsidies are restricted to subsistence consumption levels and capped by a burden limit – as in 
Chile. Indeed, the actual targeting performance of administrative selection hinges on the quality 
and stringency of the eligibility criteria (le Blanc, 2008, p. 19; World Bank, 2000, p. 17). 
Moreover, there may be collusion between the water user and the authority assessing the 
eligibility for tariff discounts, particularly when this responsibility is at the municipal level 
(Gómez Lobo, 2001). 
The second requirement is that that price for all remaining water uses and users should equal the 
marginal cost of water supply. The optimal tariff thus differentiates only between subsidized and 
non-subsidized users and uses and does not allow for further intermediate stages. For tariff 
differentiation by consumption this implies a simple two-block structure where the majority of 
customers choose a consumption level in the second block where the price is efficiently high, i.e. 
only intramarginal consumption is subsidized (Estache et al., 2002, p. 78). 
3.4.3  Financial Sustainability 
Theoretically, differentiated tariffs may allow water suppliers to recover their costs without 
government subsidies if only the average price level is set correctly. The tariff differentiation can 
be determined to incorporate a cross-subsidy, i.e. such that subsidies granted to some consumers 
are perfectly compensated by the higher prices paid by others.
9 The decisive question is, however, 
whether such tariff structure can actually be implemented. Under certain conditions, the 
necessary price add-on which has to be imposed on subsidizing customers to allow for cost 
recovery may reach levels which are not politically feasible. This may be the case when the price 
discount needed to safeguard affordability for some customers is substantial, when the number of 
subsidized customers is relatively high and/or when the number of subsidizing customers is 
relatively low. In fact, a tariff system with a cross-subsidy increases the threat that customers 
facing a relatively high price opt out of grid-based supply and use alternative water sources 
instead, such as private wells (Yepes, 2003, p. 7). 
                                                 
9 In fact, a cross-subsidy may produce a conflict between financial sustainability and efficiency if the average price 
level for a volumetric consumption charge which is necessary to recover the costs of the water supplier is equal to 
marginal costs – possibly because fixed costs are covered by an additional fixed charge. In this case, for example, an 
IBT which would be desirable in terms of efficiency – including a lifeline block priced below and a second block 
prices at marginal costs – cannot be designed financially sustainable by definition. The second block would have to 
be priced above marginal costs. 21 
These observations necessarily mean that attaining financial sustainability is particularly 
problematic for tariff options which are characterized by a high error of inclusion. As has been 
pointed out in Section 3.4.2, this holds particularly true for tariff differentiation by consumption. 
Cost recovery problems may be less severe for tariffs differentiated by service quality or 
administrative selection which exhibit lower errors of inclusion. However, in this case the 
eventual performance again depends on the design of the eligibility criteria (see Section 3.4.2).  
The impossibility to implement a cross-subsidy does not necessarily result in a deficit for the 
water supplier. The subsidy provided to some water users may be recovered by direct 
government transfer to the water supplier on behalf of the user, an approach that has been 
implemented in Chile (Foster and Yepes, 2006). 
3.4.4  Administrative simplicity 
With tariffs differentiated by self-selection, decision-making costs are relatively low for the water 
supplier or regulator. In order to allocate the subsidy, no knowledge about individual income 
levels is need. However, it may be difficult for water customers to take appropriate consumption 
decisions. Under an IBT, the average and marginal price signals are not straightforward and may 
impair customer’s ability to react to prices – particularly when a change in consumptions levels 
results in a move from one block to another (Boland and Whittington, 2000, p. 229). Obviously, 
considering the number of persons supplied by an connection in order to improve the 
affordability of an IBT (see Section 3.4.1) increases decision-making costs: Water customers may 
have to apply for block extensions and report their family size while water suppliers have to 
verify that this information is correct (Dahan and Nisan, 2007, p. 4; OECD, 2003, p. 88; 2009, p. 
91).  
Administrative simplicity is lower under tariff systems with administrative selection. In this case, 
the characteristics of water users have to be assessed and updated on a regular basis to distribute 
(implicit) subsidies (Fankhauser and Tepic, 2007, p. 1047). Transaction costs are likely to be 
highest when individual welfare means, rather than easier observable characteristics of 
geographical location or economic activity, are used for tariff differentiation. The actual extent of 
transaction costs under means-tested tariff schemes, as well as the distribution of these costs 
among the water supplier, the regulator and water users, depends on several aspects. Firstly, costs 
usually increase in the quality of data. Data collection may be based on reported income, as in 
many former Soviet states, on an outside inspection of the water user’s dwelling, or on an 
extensive face-to-face interview, as in Chile (Gómez Lobo and Contreras, 2003a, p. 5; World 
Bank, 2000, p. 17). Decision-making costs increase if customers are also required to submit 22 
additional documentation, such as pay stubs or electricity bills, or if the water supplier has to 
collect supporting information from third parties, such tax offices. Both proceedings are 
particularly cumbersome, if not infeasible, in countries with strong informal economies (Coady et 
al., 2004, p. 49). Secondly, transaction costs increase if a price reduction is not funded by a cross-
subsidy but by a direct government subsidy, as in Chile. This requires a high amount of 
institutional capacity to actually transfer the subsidy to water users or the water supplier (Gómez 
Lobo and Contreras, 2003a). Thirdly, the administrative burden associated with a tariff scheme is 
higher for all actors involved if the system to identify and reach the poor is single-purpose rather 
than multi-purpose. In the latter case, the system is also used for other social transfer programs 
and the associated costs are shared (Coady et al., 2004, p. 49; Gómez Lobo, 2001; le Blanc, 2008, 
p. 19). In Chile, for example, administrative costs of the multi-purpose system account for 1.2 per 
cent of the total of the different subsidies distributed through this system – compared with a 
share of 17.8 per cent if only the water subsidy scheme had to bear all costs (Estache et al., 2002, 
p. 76).
10 Fourthly, transaction costs increase for water users if they have to apply for the water 
subsidy (Gómez Lobo, 2001). It may be difficult for them to determine in advance whether they 
are eligible for the subsidized tariff or not. Some users fearing high administrative hurdles may 
then decide not to apply even though they would be eligible. In this case, it may be helpful if the 
water supplier or a public authority informs eligible water users. Transaction costs of a central 
authority may be lower than the aggregated information costs of individual water customers 
(Irwin, 1997, p. 3). 
3.5  Options Related to the Implementation Process 
A water supplier may also create a subsidy by deliberately choosing to implement a water price 
not perfectly strictly. This implies that (some) water users’ effective bills are below the level which 
would correspond to their actual use and cost of the water service. There are two basic means to 
relax price implementation. Firstly, the water supplier may reduce its efforts to monitor the 
network and actual water consumption. Thereby, it may allow for illegal withdrawals and meter 
manipulations. Secondly, the water supplier may abstain from sanctioning payment arrears by 
disconnection (Komives et al., 2006, p. 4; World Bank, 2000, p. 10). A policy of relaxed 
implementation is usually not explicitly announced. Nevertheless, such subsidies may be 
                                                 
10 Similarly, transaction costs of tariffs differentiated by geographical location can be reduced. In Colombia, for 
example, municipalities are allowed to base tariff differentiation on the stratification which has been developed for 
differentiating the land tax (Gómez Lobo and Contreras, 2003a, p. 10). 23 
substantial. In Colombia, they have been estimated to account for 24 per cent of all subsidies in 
water and sanitation (Estache et al., 2002, p. 21). 
3.5.1  Affordability 
Whether poor water users benefit from lax price implementation depends first of all on how this 
policy is applied. If implementation efforts are generally reduced, they are similar to a universal 
subsidy and may reach many poor. If the decision is made on a by-case basis, the underlying 
decision criteria are decisive for the actual effect for affordability. Usually, however, a pro-poor 
bias can be observed (Estache et al., 2002, p. 21). For example, it is often particularly poor 
customers who are not disconnected in the case of payment arrears. Nevertheless, the eventual 
performance with respect to affordability also depends crucially on the risk perceptions of water 
customers. If poor customers are risk-averse and/or value the risks of detection (in the case of 
meter manipulations and illegal withdrawals) and disconnection as high, they may decide to 
comply, and will not benefit from a relaxed implementation policy (World Bank, 2000, p. 10). 
What is more, relaxing the implementation process may deteriorate affordability problems in the 
long run - quite similar to a reduction of the average price level (see Section 3.3.1). This because it 
reduces the efficiency and financial sustainability of water supply and results in increased water 
scarcity and deficient infrastructure – and both effects are likely to impair affordability for the 
poor even further. 
3.5.2  Efficiency 
Obviously, lax implementation efforts reduce the incentive to save water and may result in 
significant overconsumption. Moreover, the allocation of water consumption across different 
water users and uses may be distorted due to differentiated monitoring and enforcement efforts 
by the water supplier and heterogeneous risk perceptions of water users (World Bank, 2000, p. 
11). Generally, non-compliance and the resulting inefficient distortions will be less important if 
water customers are risk-averse or exhibit good payment behaviour for cultural reasons. 
3.5.3  Financial Sustainability 
As this approach usually does not provide for a cross-subsidy, it affects the water supplier’s 
budget negatively and will require additional government support. This detrimental effect will be 
lower if implementation efforts are not relaxed across the board but primarily for poor 
customers. Moreover, the reduction of revenues will be the smaller, the more water users pay 
their bills despite relaxed implementation efforts – e.g., due to risk aversion or traditionally good 
payment behaviour (World Bank, 2000, p. 11). More profoundly, however, relaxing monitoring 24 
and enforcement may draw the entire pricing system into question and deteriorate payment 
behaviour in the long run. 
3.5.4  Administrative Simplicity 
It is the basic appeal of this approach that it reduces the necessary administrative efforts, 
particularly the monitoring and enforcement costs of water pricing schemes. 
4  Summary and Conclusion 
This paper has outlined that policy-makers have a variety of pricing options at their disposal to 
address the affordability of urban water supply – at least in theory. By modifying one or more of 
the different components of water price design – object of pricing, assessment base, average price 
level, tariff and implementation process – policy-makers can determine for which water users the 
burden of water pricing is reduced and for which not. Obviously, it always depends on the 
specific design patterns of existing pricing schemes – such as the size of a price discount or the 
eligibility criteria which have to be met to receive this discount – whether all water users are able 
to afford their basic water needs. However, the review of theoretical and empirical literature 
carried out in this paper clearly revealed two overarching sets of limits to addressing affordability 
by water price design. 
First of all, the performance of water prices is constrained by the technological and socio-
economic environment into which they are embedded. For example, a reduced consumption 
charge will only support water users who are connected to the network, while those 
predominantly poor without access to the service will not benefit. Likewise, an increasing block 
tariff based on consumption per connection cannot help poor customers with large families or 
shared connections. Table 1 summarizes the most important technological and socio-economic 
limits associated with the different water pricing options under consideration. 
Secondly, addressing affordability usually brings about trade-offs with respect to other criteria. If 
the average price level is reduced, for example, water users do not face the full costs of water 
supply and consume too much in terms of efficiency, and the water supplier cannot recover its 
costs. Tariff differentiation implies that the incentives to use or save water are not efficiently 
allocated among different groups of water users and uses. Table 2 provides an overview of such 
trade-offs for the different options of water pricing. 
Due to these limits, there is no generally superior pricing option to address affordability. The 
decision which pricing option to implement has to be made on a case-by-case basis. It has to take 
into account the specific characteristics of the technological and socio-economic environment 25 
prevailing in a city or country. Moreover, it has to find a balance between affordability and other 
pricing objectives, which is eventually a question of political preferences. In many cases, an 
optimal water pricing scheme will have to encompass a combination of pricing options. This 
review is meant to provide some guidance for this political decision-making process. 
Finally, the limits to addressing affordability by water pricing, as they are pointed out in this 
paper, also indicate that additional, non-price measures will be required in many cases to improve 
poor water users’ ability to pay. Estache et al. (2002) and OECD (2003) provide overviews of 
potential policies. Firstly and most importantly, additional measures to improve access to water 
supply may be warranted. These may include infrastructure investments in general, universal 
service obligations for water suppliers, the use of non-conventional, low-cost supply technologies 
(e.g., condominials), and also measures to regulate, legitimize and promote non-grid-based 
alternatives for water supply (e.g., community-based approaches). Secondly, water users may be 
granted income support by direct income transfers, housing allowances or special loans. 
Moreover, utility payments can be designed to better match income streams, e.g., by more 
flexible and/or frequent billing are pre-payment. Thirdly, the cost of water consumption may be 
reduced, for example, by allowing lower service quality for the poor (e.g., a higher probability of 
service interruption) or by introducing service limiters to limit water consumption (instead of 
disconnection). Fourthly, measures to reduce consumption itself may be employed. Options may 
encompass demand management or conservation programmes for the poor, which provide inter 
alia free water audits, free repair of leaks and the replacement of inefficient appliances. A 
portfolio of (constrained) water pricing reductions and such complementary instruments may 
help promote affordability of water supply effectively for all poor. 
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Table 1: Possible limits to achieving affordability for different water pricing options 
Components of 
price design  Pricing options  Limits associated with  
the technological environment 
Limits associated with  
the socio-economic environment 
Object of pricing 
Water consumption (subsidized consumption 
charge)   -  Low connection rate among the poor   
Installation of a new connection to the water 
network (subsidized connection charge) 
-  Lack of network in poor neighbourhoods 
-  High need (and cost) of additional intra-
household fixtures 
- Lack of legal land title among the poor
-  Inability to provide security deposit 
-  Incompatibility between utility payments and 




per volume of consumption - Low metering rate among the poor
per connection  - Low rate of shared connections among 
the poor 
- Low per-capita consumption of poor
-  Small/average size of poor families 
Connection charge per connection
Average price level 
Reduced single-part price 
Two-part price 
Fixed charge reduced, 
volumetric charge not reduced    
Fixed charge reduced, 
volumetric charge increased 
- High rate of shared connections among 
the poor 
- High per-capita consumption of the poor






Without consideration of user 
no. per connection 
-  High rate of shared connections among 
the poor 
- High per-capita consumption of the poor
-  Large size of poor families  
-  Resale of water to neighbours 
With consideration of user no. 
per connection    
Self-selected differentiation by service  - Lack of public stand pipes available to 
the poor  -  Low willingness to accept low-quality service 
Administrative differentiation by individual welfare 
means    
Administrative differentiation by geographical 
location    - High heterogeneity of income levels within 
neighbourhoods 
Administrative differentiation by economic activity
Implementation 
process  Lax monitoring and enforcement    -  High risk aversion among the poor 
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Table 2: Trade-offs between affordability and other policy objectives for different water pricing options 
Components of 
price design  Pricing options  Affordability  Efficiency  Financial Sustainability Administrative 
Simplicity 
Object of pricing 
Water consumption (subsidized consumption 
charge)  +/- 
+ + +  Installation of a new connection to the water 




per volume of consumption +/- + +/- -
per connection +/- - +/- +
Connection charge per connection + + + +
Average price level 
Reduced single-part price  +/- - - +
Two-part price 
Fixed charge reduced, 
volumetric charge not reduced  + + - 
-  Fixed charge reduced, 
volumetric charge increased  +/- - + 





Without consideration of user 







With consideration of user 
number per connection  + - 
Self-selected differentiation by service + +
Administrative differentiation by individual welfare 
means  +/- 
-  Administrative differentiation by geographical 
location  +/- 
Administrative differentiation by economic activity +
Implementation 
process  Lax monitoring and enforcement  +/-  -  -  + 
Legend:   +   Objective can be attained (if other components of water price design are properly designed). 
-    Objective cannot be attained (even if other components of water price design are properly designed). 
+/-   Whether or not objective can be attained depends on the implementation of water pricing and the characteristics of the 
technological and socio-economic environment.28 
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